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Abstract
Based on Indonesia’s hybrid BPJS Kesehatan health system, we analyze for welfare-opti-
mal government financing strategy in an economy with a mixed health system using an 
endogenous growth framework with physician dual practice. We find the model solution 
to produce two vastly different regimes in terms of policy implications: a “high” public-
sector congestion regime as in the benchmark case of Indonesia, and a “low” public-sector 
congestion, high capacity regime. In the former, welfare-optimal health financing strategy 
appears to be promoting private health service. In contrast, in the low-congestion, high 
capacity regime, a welfare-optimal strategy is to do the opposite of increasing government 
physician wage at the expense of private health subsidy. These results highlight the impor-
tance of developing a benchmarking system that measures the actual degree of congestion 
faced by the public health service in a developing economy, as it ultimately would influ-
ence the optimal health financing strategy to be pursued.
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Introduction
The question on what constitutes the best policy approach in managing and financing a 
national health system in a developing economy remains a subject of much debate. As 
summarized in Saksena et al. (2010), for some the expansion of private health services to 
complement public health provision is desirable as this represents a gain in efficiency and 
the quality of health care, whereas for others the private sector is inherently inequitable and 
could create disincentive for health workers to provide their best effort in public practice, 
especially those who engage in dual practice (Berman and Cuizon 2004). Indeed, despite 
being prevalent in numerous developing-economy health system, physician dual prac-
tice can exist in various different forms due to the heterogeneity of national heath system 
across countries (McPake et al. 2011, 2014; Hort and Hipgrave 2013). In many develop-
ing economies, especially those with geographically sparse regions, the government often 
has to channel public funding to support private health facilities, in addition to the wage 
bill of government doctors. Indeed, the role of government in subsidizing private health 
service cost in developing economies is highlighted in Gina et al. (2012), who reviewed 
health insurance reforms in nine developing countries, and documented that many of these 
national health systems are “hybrid” in nature, i.e. private health care is also effectively 
public financed. This is epitomized by the “new” national health system of Indonesia post-
2014, where true private voluntary health insurance is not well-developed and the “private” 
health financing schemes are government-owned, resulting in the government essentially 
supporting both public and private health care. In an attempt to achieve universal health 
coverage by 2019, Indonesia launched the BPJS Kesehatan system in 2014 and effectively 
doubled down on the government’s role in financing a mixed health system, since BPJS 
administers the national health insurance, Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional. This fascinating 
hybrid case of a national health system therefore provides an ideal case for our analysis of 
mixed health system financing.
Being the world’s fourth most populous country, Indonesia’s decentralized heath care 
system is an interesting case study for the evaluation of the macroeconomic effects of a 
mixed health financing system in which physician dual practice is common. Historically, 
out-of-pocket private health expenditure has played a more important role than public 
health spending in Indonesia. Despite this, private voluntary health insurance is not well 
developed in Indonesia, with the “private insurance” providers technically also government 
funded. For instance, of the three major health financing programs that existed pre-2014 
reform into the BPJS Kesehatan system, the P.T. Askes program covers the civil servants 
and their dependents, the Jamkesmas is public funded to cover the poorest segment of the 
population, and Jamsostek is similar to a classic social insurance program for private sec-
tor employees managed by a state enterprise (Thabrany 2008).1 These historical institu-
tional features therefore result in a hybrid mixed health system, with many of the features 
retained by the new national health insurance system, BPJS Kesehatan. In other words, 
in the conventional context of public (directly through government doctors’ wages) and 
1 Also, see Rokx et al. (2009) for further description of the major health financing programs in Indonesia 
prior to the introduction of the current BPJS Kesehatan system. In short, despite being structured as private 
institutions that also sell private commercial policies, P.T. Askes and P.T. Jamsostek were administered by 
the Ministry of Health and were therefore akin to private health service provider being subsidized by the 
government. While both have been succeeded by BPJS Kesehatan and BPJS Ketenagakerjaan under the 
new system, similar structures of government insurance companies are retained.
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private health financing (through private insurance), for Indonesia both of these financ-
ing elements are ultimately led back to the fiscal budget. Indeed, since its conception in 
2014, the national system of BPJS Kesehatan has been facing a deficit, therefore providing 
a source of persistent pressure to the fiscal budget (Fossati 2017; Pisani et al. 2016). As 
seen later, these provide the main rationales for the design of our model.
The case of Indonesia raises important knowledge gaps in the present literature on 
health financing, which this study attempts to address. First, despite the large microeco-
nomics literature focusing on examining the implications of physician dual practice and the 
welfare effects of different regulations, to our knowledge, the link to the overall financing 
of a national health system is not explored. Second, while there are existing theoretical 
growth models focusing on examining the links between health expenditure and economic 
growth, the effects of physician dual practice on consumers’ choice in a mixed health 
system have never been examined, especially in a developing economy context.2 Third, 
while there exists a rich variety of case studies and country-level reports, there remains a 
vacuum in terms of a theoretical study that seeks to identify the overall welfare implica-
tions associated with the dynamic trade-off of public and private health financing made 
by the government. We address these by developing an endogenous growth model with 
micro-foundations of a mixed health care system and physician dual-practice, to analyze 
for potential (or lack thereof) welfare-optimal government financing strategy for a mixed 
health system in developing countries. To preview, we find the model solution to produce 
two vastly different regimes in terms of policy implications: a “high” public-sector conges-
tion regime as in our benchmark case of Indonesia, and a “low” public-sector congestion, 
high capacity regime. In the benchmark regime where public-sector capacity is low, we 
find that a government subsidy to private health care is both growth- and welfare-enhanc-
ing. This is more effective than a public-sector “rewarding” policy in raising government 
physicians’ wage if its goal is to improve physician effort in public practice. In this regime, 
welfare-optimal health financing strategy appears to be promoting private health service. 
In contrast, in the low-congestion, high capacity regime, a welfare-optimal strategy is to 
do the opposite of increasing government physician wage. Nevertheless, the private health 
subsidy policy is able to produce welfare-enhancing results in this regime too under certain 
scenarios. These findings suggest that the question of an optimal financing in Indonesia’s 
hybrid national health system does not have a straightforward answer, though the provi-
sion of private health subsidy is more likely to be welfare-enhancing if the true underlying 
regime cannot be ascertained. This may explain the current underperformance of Indone-
sia’s BPJS Kesehatan system, and the policy direction the government opted to go forward 
with by continuously reforming its private health care sector. These results also highlight 
the importance of developing a benchmarking system that measures the actual degree of 
congestion faced by the public health service, as it ultimately influences the optimal health 
financing strategy to be pursued.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. “Literature review” section provides a 
brief review on the relevant literature. “The model” section presents the model, and follow-
ing the definition of the relevant equilibrium concepts, proceeds to solve for the dynamic 
2 It is well-documented empirically that the causal effects between health expenditure and economic 
growth are significantly different between developed and developing economies. For instance, see Rana 
et al. (2019). The policy implications derived on mixed practice from the existing theoretical contributions, 
primarily focusing on developed economies, are therefore non-transferable to a developing economy con-
text.
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system characterizing the model solutions. In “The model” section, the model is calibrated 
for Indonesia. After that, we analyze the model properties by implementing a series of pol-
icy experiments in “Model calibration and parametrization” section. “Policy experiments” 
section draws on policy implications from the experiments to conclude the article.
Literature review
In the microeconomics literature on physician dual practice, it is well established that dual 
practice is prevalent in numerous health systems of developed and developing countries. 
For instance, in the UK approximately two-thirds of NHS (National Health Service) con-
sultants have significant private work (Humphrey and Russell 2004). According to the 
newest 2016 Indonesian Family Life Survey, at least 50% of the public community physi-
cians reported to have a private practice. Similarly, Gruen et al. (2002) believe that more 
than 80% of the government physicians in Bangladesh engage in private practice, while 
McPake et al. (2013) show that 55% of physicians surveyed in three African cities engaged 
in dual practice. The literature of dual practice in a mixed health market is limited but 
growing. Thorough reviews of existing literature of physician dual practice have been stud-
ied by Eggleston and Bir (2006), García-Prado and González (2007), and Socha and Bech 
(2011). Some studies, such as Ferrinho et al. (2004), Humphrey and Russell (2004), and 
Askildsen and Holmås (2013) explored the motivation of physician for having dual prac-
tice. The consensus arrived is that, public physicians engage in dual practice mainly due to 
the two reasons of financial incentive and strategic influence. These imply that, while low 
public pay does create the incentive for private practice (Ferrinho et al. 1998), physicians 
also appreciate the greater freedom and efficiency in the private sector. However, there are 
other studies that suggest that, allowing physician dual practice is costly and has negative 
impacts on the quality of public health care. González (2004, (2005) argue that dual-prac-
tice physician may over-provide medical services in public in order to increase his prestige, 
and divert low-cost patients to his private practice in order to achieve his financial aim. 
Brekke and Sørgard (2007) develop a theoretical model to argue that allowing physician 
dual practice will induce physicians to provide less supply or attention in the public sector, 
which in turn leads to lower overall health provision. However, they did suggest that allow-
ing dual practice in a mixed health care market may be socially desirable. This view is 
shared by Biglaiser and Ct (2007), who develop another model that suggests allowing dual 
practice always enhances aggregate patients’ welfare, even though dual-practice physicians 
may refer patients to their private practices. Indeed, González and Macho-Stadler (2013) 
find that an outright ban on dual practice is seldom optimal, though the various scenarios 
they have examined suggest that different policy interventions may be warranted for differ-
ent health systems.
As mentioned, while the microeconomics literature has reviewed the welfare effects of 
various regulations affecting dual practice, an explicit link to the relatively macroeconomic 
issue of government financing of the national health system is not well explored. By impli-
cation of this missing link that bridges the microeconomic and macroeconomic issues, the 
effect of dual practice on the average health status of the population and consequently, pro-
ductivity and economic growth is also not well understood. This is despite over 200 years 
of empirical evidence on health-led growth discussed and documented in Madsen (2018). 
In the theoretical macro-literature, while the benefits of government’s health expenditure 
are well-documented (Chakraborty 2004; Agénor 2008, 2015), to our knowledge, the 
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interaction between public and private expenditure on health has only been modeled in 
a simplistic manner. Specifically, in studies such as Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007), pri-
vate health expenditure is modeled as generational investment for old age, while public 
expenditure as largely exogenous. Similarly, in studies such as Osang and Sarkar (2008) 
and Kunze (2014), the positive non-linearity between life expectancy and economic growth 
is explained in the context of inter-generational human capital investment. In essence, most 
of these studies, including peripheral models focusing on health-gender equality (Agénor 
et al. 2014; Agénor and Canuto 2015) and health-environment nexus (Mariani et al. 2010), 
model health mainly in the context of children, with the subsequent adult health status 
being a result of persistence. The feature of health-service quality that determines patients’ 
choice of health care and therefore directly on adult health status has therefore never been 
considered. Addressing this missing link between the microeconomics and macroeconom-
ics of health literature is therefore our primary motivation.
The model
Consider an economy with discrete time t = 0, 1, ...,∞ . Population is constant and normal-
ized to N̄ = 1 , and consists of two-period lived individuals (adulthood and old age; there 
is a constant  ∈ (0, 1) share of adults in any given period t) with identical preferences, 
save for having different valuation of the quality of health services. Due to this difference, 
individuals’ willingness-to-pay for health care are mapped along a continuous distribution, 
indexed by  ∈ (0, 1) . Individuals use either public health care (free of charge) or private 
health services. In each period, the consumption for health care arises due to an illness that 
occurs to each individual, and the illness is assumed to proportionately affect the health 
status of each individual with the same degree of severity.3 There is a survival probability 
of t in which individuals survive to old age. Each individual is risk neutral and endowed 
with one unit of time in each period of life. In old age, time is allocated entirely to leisure. 
Savings are held only in the form of physical capital. Individuals have no other endow-
ments, except for initial stocks of health ( h0 ) and physical capital ( KP0  ) at time t = 0.
In addition to private individuals, there is a representative physician who allocates his 
one unit of effort among leisure, public practice, and private practice. As in the theoretical 
literature on dual practice, such as Rickman and McGuire (1999), González (2005) and 
Brekke and Sørgard (2007), there is only one form of dual practice, and the latter is sup-
plied to a price-taking private hospital. Given that the physician gets to set his private-
practice wage, he will always prefer private practice. The effort in private practice is there-
fore demand-determined. The physician’s wage in the public health care system is paid by 
a balanced-budget government, who also spends on health infrastructure and subsidizes 
private health care cost incurred by the households. Lastly, there is a continuum of identi-
cal price-taking firms producing non-storable final goods used either for consumption or 
3 This assumption is commonly made in general equilibrium model to ensure that in the steady state, sym-
metry allows for analytically tractable solution system to be derived. In practice, the degree of severity 
faced by each individual after he/she has fallen ill will be different, but some degree of homogeneity or 
aggregation is usually assumed. Indeed, Biglaiser and Ct (2007) and Brekke and Sørgard (2007) are the 
examples of theoretical studies that make simplification assumption that is similar to ours.
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investment. There is imperfect information for firms in that they observe only the average 
labor efficiency level and therefore pays a common efficiency wage to all labor.4
Preferences and health status
There is a continuum of individuals, mapped by  ∈ (0, 1) , receives net wage income (paid 
by firms according to the average labor efficiency level in the economy) by supplying labor. 
The wage income is either saved, spent in consuming final goods, or for those who opt so, 
in private health care. Health services in the economy are provided either by public hospi-
tal (free of charge) or private hospital (incurring a health care cost, hct ).  follows a contin-
uous distribution with density function f () and cumulative distribution function F() . For 
tractability,  is assumed to be uniformly distributed on its support, and enters additively 
into preferences of private health care users. As such, the expected lifetime utility at the 
beginning of period t of an individual j = PH , GH is given by
where cjt ( c
j
t+1
 ) denotes consumption of final good in adulthood (old age) for individual j, hjt 
( hj
t+1
 ) is the health status of an individual j in adulthood (old age), t ∈ [0, 1] is the survival 
probability common to all individuals regardless of whether they use private ( j = PH ) or 
public health care ( j = GH ),  measures the relative contribution of ordinary consump-
tion to utility, 𝛬 < 1 is the discount factor, t the expectation operator conditional on infor-
mation at time t. The specification assumes a realistic non-independence of ordinary con-
sumption and health status, which is consistent with studies such as Agénor (2008). For 
simplicity, we assume individuals do not derive disutility from working.
The period-specific budget constraints are given by
where aA
t
wt is the efficiency wage ( aAt  the average labor efficiency in the economy, wt the 
wage rate),  ∈ (0, 1) the tax rate, st saving, and rt+1 the rental rate of private capital in 
period t + 1 . Equation (3) indicates that individuals consume in old age ( t + 1 ) with a 
(1)Vjt =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
ln(c
j
t)
(h
j
t)
1− + tt
�
ln(c
j
t+1
)(h
j
t+1
)1−
�
+ ln t,
ln(c
j
t)
(h
j
t)
1− + tt
�
ln(c
j
t+1
)(h
j
t+1
)1−
� if j = PH
if j = GH
,
(2)cjt + s
j
t =
{
(1 − )aA
t
wt − hct, if j = PH
(1 − )aA
t
wt if j = GH
,
(3)tc
j
t+1|t = (1 + rt+1)s
j
t, j = PH,GH.
4 Overall, these model specifications are consistent with the key features of the hybrid health system in 
Indonesia (or broadly developing Southeast Asia), as described in studies such as Rokx et al. (2009), Fos-
sati (2017). However, two deviations from reality are of note and are made for analytical simplification: 
(i) although small (in 2010, the number of physicians per 1000 people in Indonesia is only 0.14), there are 
obviously more than one physician in Indonesia; (ii) Indonesia has consistently maintained a small budget 
deficit in the range of 0.7–2.5% over the past 10 years. To model these two features will involve introducing 
framework of endogenous skills acquisition and debt dynamics, which are peripheral to our objectives but 
come with the cost of greater model complexity.
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probability t , assumed as exogenous following Blackburn and Cipriani (2002).5 Solving 
for the individual’s utility maximization problem with respect to intertemporal consump-
tion yields the Euler equation, tc
j
t+1
∕c
j
t = (1 + rt+1).
Due to the one-off nature of the illness and the heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay, 
individuals’ choice of health services are solely determined by their relative position along 
the uniform distribution of  . In fact, as seen later, we can derive a threshold willingness-
to-pay, 𝜉 ĉ
t
 , which would then allow for the determination of the share of patients using pub-
lic health services, C
t
 , based on the cumulative distribution of .
The actual health status of an individual j = PH , GH is therefore given by
where H , C ≥ 0 ,  ∈ (0, 1) measures the effect of the illness, h0 is a constant baseline 
health status endowed to individuals at birth (and assumed to be same for all individual j), 
ePH
t
 and eGH
t
 the effort level allocated by the physician in private and public practice respec-
tively, and HG
t
 the broad health infrastructure made available by the government for every-
one in the economy. Unlike March and Schroyen (2005), we do not explicitly introduce a 
waiting time for public health service. Instead, the quality of public health service (and its 
impact on health status) is subject to congestion/capacity issue associated with the overall 
size of public patients, 𝜉C
t
N̄ . Specifically, the more patients use free government health care 
(the larger 𝜉C
t
N̄ is), for a given (anti-)congestion parameter  > 0 , the effective congestion 
[denominator for j = GH in (4)] will be larger, therefore lowering health status. Never-
theless, given that 𝜉C
t
N̄ ∈ [0, 1] , if we were interested instead in evaluating the impact of 
different congestion for a given public-sector patient size (as explored in “Extension and 
robustness” section), then the smaller the (anti-)congestion parameter value  > 0 is, the 
larger the effectiveness congestion, (𝜉C
t
N̄) , will be.
For old age, given the presence of the non-zero mortality rate, we follow Agénor and 
Canuto (2015) to specify
Likewise, for simplicity, labor efficiency is specified as having a one-to-one relationship to 
health status, in that aA
t
= hA
t
, where hA
t
= (1 − C
t
)hPH
t
+ C
t
hGH
t
 , and let C
t
 denote the share 
of individuals using public health services and 1 − C
t
 the share using private. Equivalently, 
given (4),
An individual finds it optimal to pay for private health care if his/her expected lifetime 
utility exceeds the expected utility of using only public health care, t(VPHt ) ≥ t(V
GH
t
) , or
(4)hjt =
{
𝜃h0(e
PH
t
)𝜈H (HG
t
)𝜈C ,
𝜃h0
(𝜉Ct N̄)

(eGH
t
)𝜈H (HG
t
)𝜈C
if j = PH
if j = GH
,
(5)hjt+1 = th
j
t, j = PH,GH.
(6)hAt = 𝜃h0(H
G
t
)𝜈C
[
(ePH
t
)𝜈H (1 − 𝜉C
t
) + (eGH
t
)𝜈H
(𝜉C
t
)1−
(N̄)
]
.
5 This specification follows Agénor (2015) and essentially assumes the presence of an actuarially fair annu-
ity market that channels savings to investment in physical capital for the production in the next period. With 
the annuity market, old-age survivors share the savings plus interest left by savers who die in adulthood. 
The effective rate of return to saving would thus be (1 + r
t+1)∕t , which would yield an equation similar to 
(3). Alternatively, it can also be assumed that the saving left by individuals who fail to survive to old age is 
confiscated by the government, who then spends it for unproductive purposes.
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There exists a threshold value of the willingness-to-pay, 𝜉 ĉ
t
 , above which all individuals 
with higher value would opt to pay for private health care. In specifying (7), we assume 
that an individual knows if his/her willingness-to-pay is above or below the threshold 𝜉 ĉ
t
 
and can therefore decide whether to pay for private health care or not at the beginning 
of adulthood.6 For analytical tractability, the private (interpretable as out-of-pocket) 
health care cost is specified to be proportional to the gross efficiency wage income, where 
hct = ta
A
t
wt , with t ∈ R , t = (0 − sHt ) , 0 ∈ (0, 1) , and s
H
t
 a private (per individual) 
health care subsidy provided by the government in period t.
As shown in Online Appendix, setting (7) as equality, we can derive a threshold value 
𝜉 ĉ
t
,
Given that the share of individuals using public hospital equals 
𝜉C
t
= N̄𝜉C
0
∫
𝜉 ĉ
t
0
f (𝜉)d𝜉 = 𝜉C
0
𝜉 ĉ
t
N̄ , and the share of individuals using private health service 
equals 1 − C
t
 , for some multiplicative constant C
0
≥ 0 , by using (4), we have:
or equivalently, if N̄ is normalized to one,
which depends non-linearly on the ratio of physician effort between the two health care 
services.
Private health care
There is a price-taking private hospital that receives its revenue in the form of the total 
private health care cost, hct , paid by the 1 − Ct  individuals. Taking this revenue, individu-
als’ health care choice, physician’s effort in public practice ( eGH
t
 ), and the private-prac-
tice wage rate, wPH
t
 (determined monopolistic competitively by the physician) as given, 
the private hospital chooses the amount of physician effort, ePH
t
 , to maximizes profits, 
maxePHt Π
PH
t
= (1 − 𝜉C
t
)N̄𝜇ta
A
t
wt − w
PH
t
ePH
t
.
Given (6), and knowing that N̄ = 1 , we derive the demand function of ePH
t
,
(7)
ln(cPH
t
)(hPH
t
)1− + tt
[
ln(cPH
t+1
)(hPH
t+1
)1−
]
+ ln t
≥ ln(cGH
t
)(hGH
t
)1− + tt
[
ln(cGH
t+1
)(hGH
t+1
)1−
]
.
𝜉 ĉ
t
=
[
1 − 𝜏
1 − 𝜏 − 𝜇t
]𝜅( hPH
t
hGHt
)𝜅−1
.
𝜉C
t
=
𝜉C
0
𝛺t
(N̄)
1+(𝜅−1)
1−(1−𝜅)
(
ePH
t
eGHt
) 𝜈H (𝜅−1)
1−(1−𝜅)
, where 𝛺t =
(
1 − 𝜏
1 − 𝜏 − 𝜇t
) 𝜅
1−(1−𝜅)
,
(8)C
t
= C
0
t
(
ePH
t
eGHt
) H (−1)
1−(1−)
, where t =
(
1 − 
1 −  − t
) 
1−(1−)
,
6 Equation (7) is assumed to hold as a strict inequality for the individual with the highest  , that is,  = 1 , 
otherwise nobody would choose to pay for private health care.
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Even though there is only a single representative physician in the economy, the physi-
cian in dual practice ( ePH
t
> 0 ) will always prefer to meet the demand from private hos-
pital, given that he/she has control of the private-practice wage rate. Given the perceived 
demand function, which determines the marginal revenue, the representative physician 
therefore behaves as if he/she is in a monopolistically competitive market by setting his/
her “price”, PPH
t
 , to maximize his/her payoff in the private sector. Given that the price in 
the perceived demand function is given in the price of PPH
t
= wPH
t
∕wt , the physician maxi-
mizes ΠI
t
= (PPH
t
− 1)ePH
t
 . Using (9), we derive the optimal private-practice “price” to be a 
constant mark-up of:
Public health care
The optimal level of eGH
t
 is derived by evaluating the physician’s participation condi-
tion in dual practice. The effort level supplied by the physician for public practice, eGH
t
 , 
can be determined using a simple specification developed in Agénor and Aizenman 
(1999). Specifically, the representative physician has one unit of effort, which is to be 
spent among leisure, public practice, and private practice. In each period t, the physician 
evaluates a period utility function that depends on the wage and effort in both practices, 
UD[wPH
t
,wGH
t
, ePH
t
, eGH
t
] . Without losing any generality, a log-utility specification means, 
for the physician to involve in dual practice, the utility derived from dual practice has to 
be at least as good as the utility derived from solely practicing in the public health care 
system:
In the margin, the physician is indifferent between dual practice and solely practice in the 
public sector. Setting (11) as equality, we solve for an expression of the optimal public-
practice effort level:
As such, instead of specifying dual practice as having a negative effect on public perfor-
mance, as in one of the scenarios examined in González and Macho-Stadler (2013), public 
effort, eGH
t
 , in this framework is a direct outcome from physician’s optimizing behavior. In 
each period t, the total income of physician, ePH
t
wPH
t
+ eGH
t
wGH
t
 , is subject to the same tax 
rate,  . For simplicity, the physician is assumed to spend all the after-tax income and does 
not save.
(9)ePH
t
=
(
tHh0
) 1
1−H
(
wt
wPHt
) 1
1−H
(HG
t
)
C
1−H (1 − C
t
)
2
1−H .
(10)PPH
t
=
wPH
t
wt
=
1
H
.
(11)
ln
{
[eGH
t
wGH
t
+ ePH
t
wPH
t
]R (1 − ePH
t
− eGH
t
)1−R
}
≥ ln[(eGH
t
wGH
t
)R (1 − eGH
t
)1−R ], where R ∈ (0, 1).
(12)eGHt =
(1 − ePH
t
)
(
1 +
ePH
t
wPH
t
eGHt w
GH
t
)
− 1
(
1 +
ePHt w
PH
t
eGHt w
GH
t
)
− 1
, where  = R∕(1 − R).
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Firms
There is a continuum of identical firms, indexed by i ∈ (0, 1) , producing non-storable 
final goods used either for consumption or investment. Production requires the use of 
effective labor and private capital rented from households. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas 
technology, the production function of firm i takes the form,
where A0 ≥ 0 , aAt  denotes the average, economy-wide labor efficiency (which is the same 
for all firms), KP,it  the firm-specific stock of capital, KPt = ∫
1
0
K
P,i
t di the aggregate private 
capital stock, Ni
t
 the number of adult workers employed by firm i, , ≥ 0 , and  ∈ (0, 1) . 
While production exhibits constant returns to scale in firm-specific inputs, similar to Lim 
(2017), production also benefits from an Arrow-Romer type of learning externality associ-
ated with the economy-wide aggregate private capital stock, which is subject to a conges-
tion effect of .
The inputs’ markets are competitive, and firms do not observe the actual health 
status of individuals. As such, for labor market equilibrium to hold, law of one price 
ensures that there can only be one wage rate in the economy, wt . All firms therefore 
observe the wage rate and pay wt . Each firm’s profit maximization problem is given 
by maxNit ,KP,it Π
i
t
= Yi
t
− rtK
P,i
t − wta
A
t
Ni
t
 . Given that all firms are identical in symmet-
ric equilibrium, aA
t
= hA
t
 , let 𝛼N̄ be the total number of adults in the population, where 
 ∈ (0, 1) , in a symmetric equilibrium we have the first-order conditions:
Government
The government taxes effective wages of both the adult individuals and the representa-
tive physician at a constant rate  . It spends a total of GH
t
 on medical research and broad 
infrastructure, GG
t
 on physician’s wage in public practice, GS
t
 on a private health care 
subsidy, and GU
t
 on other (unproductive) items. It cannot issue bonds and must therefore 
run a balanced budget in any period t, where
Shares of spending are constant fractions of revenues:
where h ∈ (0, 1) , and 
∑
h = 1 . This specification is consistent with studies such as 
Chakraborty (2004) and Agénor (2015).
We know that the total bill of private health care subsidy adds up to 
GS
t
= sH
t
aA
t
wt𝛼N̄(1 − 𝜉
C
t
) , which when equating to (16), means the per-individual health 
care subsidy provided by the government is:
(13)Yit = A0
[
KP
t
(KP,it )

]
(aA
t
Ni
t
)(KP,i
t
)1− ,
(14)wt = 𝛽Yt∕(hAt 𝛼N̄), rt = (1 − 𝛽)Yt∕K
P
t
.
(15)GHt + G
G
t
+ GS
t
+ GU
t
= 𝜏𝛼N̄aA
t
wt + 𝜏(e
PH
t
wPH
t
+ eGH
t
wGH
t
).
(16)Ght = 𝜐h
[
𝜏𝛼N̄aA
t
wt + 𝜏(e
PH
t
wPH
t
+ eGH
t
wGH
t
)
]
, h = H,G, S,U,
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Also, given that the total wage bill for public practice is given by GG
t
= eGH
t
wGH
t
 , we have
To account for both the learning effect from the improving aggregate labor efficiency level 
in the economy ( aA
t
N̄ ), the production of health infrastructure is modeled as
where for consistency, the learning externality  ≥ 0 is specified to be subject to the same 
congestion factor as in the private sector, and ,  ∈ (0, 1) capture the spending efficiency.
Model solution
First, we assume that the representative physician spends all the net after-tax income he/
she earns in each period t. The asset market-clearing condition therefore only requires the 
private capital stock in period t + 1 to be equal to the aggregate savings made by adults in 
period t. Assuming full depreciation (a reasonable assumption for a long-range model in 
which individuals live for two periods), we have
where  ∈ (0, 1) is the share of adults in the population in each period t.
With the saving-investment balance in equilibrium, note that it is trivial to show that the 
other markets clear. In a closed economy with balanced-budget government, the amounts 
that are neither consumed nor taxed (which is used to pay for government expenditure) 
are fully reflected in savings. By definition, equation (20) therefore reflects the final goods 
market equilibrium too.
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium for this economy is characterized by the sequences 
{ct, ct+1, st}
∞
t=0
 by individuals, effort by the general physician {ePH
t
, eGH
t
}∞
t=0
 , private capital 
stock {KP
t+1
}∞
t=0
 , prices {wt,wGHt ,w
PH
t
, rt+1}
∞
t=0
 , health status {hGH
t
, hPH
t
, hA
t
, hA
t+1
}∞
t=0
 , private 
health care subsidy {sH
t
}∞
t=0
 , as well as the resulting sequences of the endogenous share of 
individuals using public health care {C
t
}∞
t=0
 , such that, for a given set of constant policy 
parameters , H,G, S, U , and initial stocks KP0  , h0,H
G
0
> 0 , individuals maximize utility, 
representative physician maximizes payoff, firms maximize profits, the product and asset 
markets clear, and the government budget is balanced.
Definition 2 A balanced growth equilibrium (BGE) is a competitive equilibrium in which 
(i) ct , ct+1 , Yt , and KPt  all grow at the constant rate  ; (ii) all health status ( h
GH
t
 , hPH
t
 , hA
t
 ) are 
constant; (iii) by implications of (i)-(ii), the wage rates ( wt,wGHt ,w
PH
t
 ) grow at the same 
rate as Yt ; and (iv) the private capital rental rate and private health care subsidy ( rt , sHt  ) are 
(17)sHt =
𝜐S𝜏
(1 − 𝜉Ct )
[
ePH
t
wPH
t
+ eGH
t
wGH
t
aAt wt𝛼N̄
+ 1
]
.
(18)e
GH
t
wGH
t
=
𝜏𝜐G
1 − 𝜏𝜐G
[
𝛼N̄aA
t
wt + e
PH
t
wPH
t
]
.
(19)HGt = H
G
0
[
aA
t
𝛼N̄
(KP,it )
𝜍
]𝜂(𝜑GH
t
)𝜖 ,
(20)KPt+1 = 𝛼N̄st = 𝛼N̄[(1 − 𝜉
C
t
)sPH
t
+ 𝜉C
t
sGH
t
],
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constant. In the BGE, the equilibrium share of individuals using public health care ( C
t
 ) is 
therefore constant too.
The wage-growth and heath status-constancy characteristics in the BGE (instead of hav-
ing it as wage being constant and health status growing like capital) are consistent with 
empirical evidence documented in Hartwig (2008, (2010), where health expenditure is 
mainly driven by wage growth over time, with limited growth-enhancing evidence from 
health capital formation. Next, to generate endogenous growth, given that KP,it = KPt ∀i in 
the symmetric equilibrium, we impose the theoretical
Assumption (1 − ) =  ,  =  , which would then turn (13) into the standard Y-K form 
of Yt
KPt
= A0(h
A
t
) . In Online Appendix, the expressions for the growth rate of private capital 
stock and final output are also derived, with the steady-state growth rate given by
where h̃A , H̃G , ?̃? , 𝜉C , and ?̃? are the steady-state values of the respective variables. Further, 
to study the transition dynamics of the model, from Online Appendix, we derive a non-
linear dynamic equation of the average health status, hA
t+1
= f (hA
t
):
where 2 = H1 , 1 = 1 + [G∕(1 − G)].
Given that capital and output growth in this economy is financed by savings, which in 
turn is a function of two main factors: (1) productivity, assumed to have a one-to-one map-
ping with average health status; (2) distribution of public health users and private health 
users, the non-linear first-difference equation, therefore Eq. (22) serves as the key dynamic 
equation driving economic growth. In Eq. (22), along the transition path, growth depends 
non-linearly on existing health status, fiscal policy parameters such as the spending shares 
( H and G directly enter into the equation, albeit non-linearly, whereas the private health 
subsidy share, S , has an indirect effect through its influence on the private practice effort 
and the individuals’ consumption-saving decisions), as well as a weighted combination of 
the chosen physician effort in both private and public health care services. Given that this 
is a general equilibrium model, both the equilibrium effort levels, as well as the shares 
of patients choosing public versus private health care, are mutually dependent and endog-
enous to each other. This means comparative static analysis with respect to these variables 
would yield analytically ambiguous results and depend on the configuration of the different 
parameter values. As such, numerical analysis-based policy experiments will be required.
Given this, as well as the complexity of the system, stability of the economy cannot 
be studied analytically. However, it is established numerically by first solving for both an 
initial BGE and end-period BGE [with a change in policy parameter(s)], then deriving the 
transitional paths using finite-difference methods similar to Fair and Taylor (1983), Trim-
born et al. (2008).
(21)1 + 𝛾 = (h̃A)𝛽 ?̃?𝛽[(1 − 𝜉C)(1 − 𝜏 − ?̃?) + 𝜉C(1 − 𝜏)],
(22)hA
t+1
=
th0
(−)C−
(
1 +
ePH
t
H
)C
(H2)
−C
[
(ePH
t
)H (1 − t)
+(eGH
t
)H (t)
1−
]
(hA
t
)[−(1−)]C ,
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Model calibration and parametrization
To examine the overall implications of dual practice, as well as the growth effects of pub-
lic and private health care financing, we calibrate the model to Indonesia, a Southeast 
Asian developing economy whose health care financing system reform towards achieving 
universal coverage in the previous decade has been well-documented (Rokx et  al. 2009; 
Fossati 2017; González et al. 2017; Pisani et al. 2016). Further, the public availability of 
micro-data from 5 waves of Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS 1–5) conducted by RAND 
researchers (see, for instance, Strauss et al. 2004, 2009, 2016) allows some model param-
eters in model equations to be empirically estimated, which we believe vastly improves 
reliability of findings from numerical policy experiments. In addition, macro-data from the 
Global Health Observatory, World Health Organization (WHO) and World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators databases are used. In sum, our calibration strategy focuses on 
matching the initial steady-state values (denoted with tilde) to the first statistical moment 
of relevant variables, so as to achieve a baseline that stylistically illustrates Indonesia dur-
ing the period 2000–15. The parameters and initial steady-state values of variables sum-
marized in Tables 1 and 2.
First, for households, following Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), we treat adult sur-
vival rate as exogenous and set ?̃? = 0.734, based on WHO’s mortality data for the 30–70 
Table 1  Parameter values: benchmark case
Parameter Description Value
Households
 Discount factor 0.907
 Relative contribution to utility 0.342

H
Elasticity (health) wrt physician effort 0.072

C
Elasticity (health) wrt infrastructure 0.55
 Parameter, inverse of effect of illness 0.56
 Shares of adults in the population 0.68
Health system and Physician
 (Anti-)congestion parameter, public health care 0.5

0
Time-invariant private health care cost 0.109

R
Relative physician preference, wage income 0.524
Firms
 Elasticity, Arrow-Romer externality 0.184
 Elasticity wrt effective labor 0.67
Public sector
 Tax rate on wages 0.171

G
Share of spending on physician wage 0.004

H
Share of spending on health infrastructure 0.0486

S
Share of spending on private health subsidy 0.022
 Public infrastructure, learning externality 0.30
 Parameter, spending efficiency 0.368
 Elasticity wrt spending flow, stock 0.55
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years-old age group in 2015.7 Next, for the discount factor,  , we parameterize it based on 
Havranek et al. (2015) meta-analysis of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for Indo-
nesia, and yields  = 1∕1.102 = 0.907 . Given this, knowing that the steady-state savings 
rate is given by ?̃? = ?̃?𝛬∕(1 + ?̃?𝛬) , yields ?̃? = 0.40 . This is a high value but within rea-
sonable range of Indonesia’s recent gross savings rates that are in excess of 30%. Further, 
from the Online Appendix, we also know that 𝛬 = (1 + 𝛾)∕(1 + r̃) must hold in the BGE. 
Given that the average real GDP growth rate of Indonesia,  = 0.053 during 2000–15, this 
means the steady-state rental rate of physical capital, r̃ = 0.161 , which is within average 
business lending rates in Indonesia. The relative contribution of ordinary consumption 
to utility,  , is parameterized based on the relative preference parameter values for con-
sumption and health in Agénor and Canuto (2015), which yields  = 0.342 . The elastic-
ity parameter of health status with respect to health service infrastructure, C = 0.55 is set 
based on Osang and Sarkar (2008), while the elasticity with respect to physician effort, H , 
is empirically estimated using the IFLS micro-data based on the log-linearized form of 
(10).8 The estimated intercept term suggests a mark-up value of approximately 13.9 times, 
which yields H = 1∕13.9 = 0.072 . This suggests a benchmark of highly inelastic health 
response with respect to physician effort. Given the critical role of this parameter in deter-
mining the effects of dual practice, extensive sensitivity analysis is further implemented 
later. For the parameter measuring the effect of illness prior to treatment,  , given that this 
Table 2  Initial steady-state 
values of key variables
Variable Description Value
𝜉C Share of individuals using public health care 0.828
ẽ
PH Effort allocated to private practice, physician 0.344
ẽ
GH Effort allocated to public practice, physician 0.299
h̃
A Average adult health status 100.0
H̃
G Stock of health infrastructure 1.000
?̃? Private health care cost, fraction of market wage 0.086
s̃
H Private health care subsidy rate 0.023
w̃ Market wage rate 1.000
w̃
PH Physician wage rate, private practice 13.889
w̃
GH Physician wage rate, public practice 0.938
?̃? Adult survival probability 0.734
 Final output growth rate 0.053
7 Endogenous mortality is a topic that is well examined in the macroeconomics literature on health and 
growth, notably in studies such as Osang and Sarkar (2008). However, it is peripheral to the core issues 
examined in this article. The introduction of endogenous survival rate, for instance to average health status, 
makes little difference to the results beyond amplifying the magnitudes of response by variables to pol-
icy shocks experimented (due to the reinforcing effect of a change in average health status). It is therefore 
abbreviated from this article.
8 Specifically, by matching the surveyed wage data from households and the monthly revenue data from 
community survey of Puskesmas Heads based on province and team code of the field team, we run different 
variations of a log-log regression of the monthly revenue (in excess of basic salary) of doctors with Private 
Practice on the wage income of households, controlling for factors such as community centre, province, and 
household IDs.
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is non-directly observable in practice, we set 𝜃 = 0.56 < ?̃? , which is proxied by the UHC 
services coverage index of 56% for Indonesia, published by the WHO.
Next, on the physician and health system parameters, the relative preference of phy-
sician towards wage income, R , is empirically estimated based on a log-linear approxi-
mated form of the marginal condition, (12). More specifically, by exploring the cross-sec-
tional properties of the responses in the IFLS, for the sample of Puskesmas Head with 
dual-practice, we proxy eGH
t
 with the (patient-adjusted) working hours per week by the 
Puskesmas head in the government health centre, and regress it against the ratio of the 
Head’s total income from joint-practice (revenue plus basic salary) over his/her basic sal-
ary as Puskesmas Head, which yields an estimated coefficient of 0.095, or equivalently, 
 = exp(0.097) = 1.100 . This then allows us to derive R = 0.524 . For the private health 
care cost, from the WHO data in 2000–15, the average out-of-pocket and domestic private 
health expenditure (as percentage of health expenditure) are 49.25% and 64.27% respec-
tively. Further, by dividing both out-of-pocket and domestic private health expenditure per 
capita (PPP $178.4 and PPP $226 ) by the surveyed mean income per capita (PPP $2, 073.2 ) 
in 2015, we get 0.086 and 0.109 respectively. The former gives ?̃? = 0.086 , while the latter 
0 = 0.109 . By implications, the steady-state private health care subsidy rate is s̃H = 0.023 . 
Given the absence of comparable estimates in the literature and the relevant variable in 
the IFLS dataset, the (inverse) capacity congestion parameter associated with the size of 
patients seeking free public health care,  , is set at 0.5, with its effects further examined 
using sensitivity analysis later. Lastly, the share of adults in the total population,  = 0.68 , 
is set, in line with the percentage of working-age population (ages 15–64) in Indonesia.
For the production parameters, the elasticity value of Arrow-Romer externality,  , is 
set at 0.184, in line with meta-analysis of Bom and Ligthart (2014). The output elasticity 
to labor,  , is set to the national accounting-based empirical estimate for Indonesia, which 
gives  = 0.67 (Aswicahyono et al. 2013). For the government, the effective tax rate,  , is 
calibrated as follows. Tax revenue as percentage of GDP averages at 0.114 in the period 
2000–15. Given a labor income share of 0.67, we calculate  = 0.114∕0.67 = 0.171 . On 
the spending shares, the share of government spending on private health subsidy can be 
computed by dividing the difference between domestic private and out-of-pocket health 
expenditure by the general government expenditure, yielding an average of S = 0.022 
for the period 2000-15. By similar logic, we know the total domestic general government 
health expenditure as percentage of general government expenditure averages at 0.0526, 
which is the sum of G and H . We further calculate the value of G by first, estimating the 
total wage bill for government doctors. Specifically, based on the physician density of 0.292 
per 1000 people, we estimated the total number of physicians and then multiplied it with 
the sample mean-annual basic salary of Puskesmas Head reported in IFLS-5. After that, 
we divide the estimated wage bill by the general government expenditure in current prices, 
yielding G = 0.004 . Given this, we then parametrize H = 0.0526 − 0.004 = 0.0486 . 
For the production of health infrastructure, the learning externality parameter,  , is para-
metrized using the value of Alpaslan and Ali (2018), which equals 0.3. The country-spe-
cific government spending efficiency parameter for Indonesia is calculated based on the 
index values of Dabla-Norris et al. (2012),  = 1.47∕4.0 = 0.368 . Lastly, following Agé-
nor et al. (2014), the elasticity of health infrastructure with respect to spending flow is set 
at  = 0.55 . The parameter values of benchmark are summarized in Table 1.
The remainders of the benchmark steady-state values of key variables in the BGE are 
determined as follows, and summarized in Table 2. First, we decide to normalize the ini-
tial steady-state value of H̃G and w̃ to 1.0, while setting health status as an index of 100. 
These are obtained by adjusting the multiplicative terms, h0 , HG0  , and A0 . Second, based 
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on responses in the IFLS Survey, 53.5% of Puskesmas Head engage in dual practice while 
46.5% practice solely in public health services. Assuming that the responses revealed the 
preference of physicians in allocating their effort, we therefore have ẽGH∕ ẽPH = 0.868 . 
From the survey, the average hours spent by a government physician in Puskesmas are 
35.87, which given 5-working days, implies ẽGH = 35.87∕(5*24) = 0.299 . Given these, 
we calculate ẽPH = 0.344.9 Third, we determine the steady-state values to be set for the 
three wage rates. From the survey, the average basic salary of a Puskesmas Head is used 
as a proxy for w̃GH . The difference between this and the average reported monthly earn-
ings allows us to then determine w̃PH . Given the empirically estimated value for H and the 
normalization of w̃ to unity, we know from (10) that w̃PH = 13.889 , which in turn allows 
us to determine w̃GH = 0.938 . Fourth, to determine the steady-state shares of individuals 
using public and private health care, we utilize the steady-state version of (17), and yields 
1 − 𝜉C = 0.172 . This means 𝜉C = 0.828.
Policy experiments
To study the model properties, we first consider two individual policy experiments, which 
involve the government reallocating 0.01 share of its budget from non-productive spending 
to finance: (i) an increase in government spending on public physicians’ wage ( G increases 
from 0.004 to 0.014); and (ii) an increase in government’s subsidy to private health care ( S 
from 0.022 to 0.032).
To measure the permanent effects on welfare, given that our economy consists of two-
period lived individuals, we adopt the perfect-foresight welfare criterion of models with 
similar structure, such as Agénor and Lim (2018). Specifically, assume now that the econ-
omy consists of infinite number of generations of two-period lived individuals that will 
replenish by nature, the social welfare function is then given by a discounted sum of utility 
along the BGE path across an infinite sequence of individuals (De la Croix and Philippe 
2002), as in Wt =
∞∑
h=0
𝛹 h[𝜉C
0
VGH
t+h
+ (1 − 𝜉C
0
)VPH
t+h
] , where  ∈ (0, 1) is the social discount 
factor, VGH
t+h
 and VPH
t+h
 measure the indirect utility functions of individuals using public and 
private health services respectively, 𝜉C
0
 and 1 − 𝜉C
0
 are time-invariant constant weights, 
which we set to equal the initial steady-state shares of households using public and private 
health care respectively.10 For simplicity, we restrict the social welfare function to only 
measure those of the private individuals. Also for tractability, we restrict our analysis to 
welfare along the BGE path, with an approximation derived in Online Appendix. All 
shocks considered are permanent in nature, with the steady-state effects of key variables 
9 These imply that the number of hours spent in private practice is 41.28. The sum of private and public 
hours is therefore approximately 77 h in 5 days, or 15 h per week. This phenomenon of overstretched physi-
cians and long working hours is well documented in Indonesia and more broadly, developing Southeast 
Asia.
10 Alternatively, weights based on steady-state relative shares (which deviate from baseline values as a 
result from each experiment), could be used. Qualitatively the results are broadly similar to those reported. 
Given that we focus only on the welfare change between the 2 steady states (and not along the transition), 
the “constant shares” specification is retained.
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summarized in Table 3 and the relevant transition dynamics in Figs. 1, 2.11 In addition to 
benchmark results, Table 3 also presents selected sensitivity analysis results.
Fig. 1  A permanent increase in government physician wage rate. An increase in ( 
G
 ) from 0.004 to 0.014 
(Percentage deviation for health status; Absolute deviations for others)
11 Similar to Agénor and Lim (2018) and other models examining transitional dynamics in the literature, 
there is a distinction between generational periods (T) and simulated period (t). In principle, T corresponds 
to 30 years in a two-period lived structure, as reflected in the assumption of full depreciation of physical 
capital. However, all of the other parameters and variables either do not have a time dimension or are cali-
brated on the basis of average annual data. For the numerical experiments, the intended length of a unit of 
time interval is therefore t = 1∕30 , or best understood as one year.
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An increase in government physician wage rate
Consider a one percentage-point permanent increase in government allocation to pub-
lic physicians’ wage ( G ). In Fig.  1, we see that this instantaneously increases the pub-
lic-practice wage rate, therefore raises the relative wage ratio. For a given level of effort, 
it becomes optimal for the physician to have a higher relative ratio of (public-private) 
Fig. 2  A permanent increase in government spending on private health subsidy. An increase in ( 
S
 ) from 
0.022 to 0.032 (Percentage deviation for health status; Absolute deviations for others)
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practice effort. While the relative effort ratio increases, in the margin of (12) and at the 
initial level of demand for private-practice effort, this means that there is a substitution 
effect driving down the required level of effort in public practice. On the opposite end, the 
direct income effect brought about by the increase in public physicians’ wage puts upward 
pressure to public physician effort. In combination, the net effect is positive to the level of 
effort provided in public practice.
At the same time, from (8), an increase in the relative (public-private) effort level means 
an improvement in public health service quality, which leads to an increase in the share 
of individuals using public health care. On impact, the overall effects on average health 
status and therefore growth rate of final output are positive. However, in the long-run as 
the economy moves towards the new steady state, the fall in the demand for private health 
care leads to lower total revenue of the private hospital, which in turn leads to a decline 
in demand for the effort in private practice. A combined decrease in effort level by the 
physician—albeit gradually—leads to a gradual decline in the total tax income of the gov-
ernment. Given that government’s investment in broad health infrastructure and private 
health subsidy is a constant fraction of the total tax income, this means lower stock of 
infrastructure and higher effective (out-of-pocket) household expenditure on health. These 
negate the initial positive effect on average health status and leads to a gradual decline in 
effective market wage received by average workers. This reduces the income of private 
individuals and consequently, consumption. In the steady state, these various general equi-
librium mechanisms translate to mildly negative effect on health status ( −0.12%), growth 
( −0.08%), and welfare ( −0.10%). These suggest that, in a mixed health system where dual 
practice is prevalent and the private sector plays a significant role in the overall landscape, 
the fall-out associated with the general equilibrium effects from an increase in government 
physician wage rate can be negative, despite its positive effect on public physicians’ effort 
level. Indeed, this appears to be robust across most of the sensitivity analysis considered in 
Table 3, save for when the public sector has a very high capacity/experiences very low con-
gestion (  = 5.0 ), utility/preference specific with very low contribution from health status 
(  = 0.8 ), or when the physician places low weight on her/his total earnings ( R = 0.3 ). 
In these three cases, the opposite of a positive steady-state effect on average health status, 
growth, and welfare are observed. Relating these to the literature, despite a vastly different 
theoretical approach, the findings are in consistent with the recommendation documented 
in García-Prado and González (2011), where “rewarding” policies for public-sector phy-
sicians are only recommended for more developed economies (which are likely to have 
higher capacity in public health provision). However, the dynamic trade-off in growth 
(between instantaneous and steady-state effects) found is new to the literature.
An increase in spending on private health subsidy
Next, consider a one percentage-point permanent increase in government allocation to pri-
vate health subsidy ( S ). This can be interpreted as a stylized representation of the gov-
ernment increasing its support on private health care, as illustrated by Indonesia’s BPJS 
Kesehatan system in 2014. Unlike the G shock, we see in Fig. 2 that the policy effects of 
key variables are consistent for both instantaneous and in the long-run steady state, with 
the transition dynamics behaving largely monotonically. On impact, an increase in S raises 
the per-individual private health subsidy provided by the government, which reduces the 
total out-of-pocket health care cost of the private individuals. More individuals are then 
willing to pay for private health care, resulting in an increase in the share of individuals 
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using private health service, 1 − C
t
 . Both the increase in the total private health expendi-
ture and private individuals using private health service mean the private hospital responds 
by demanding more private practices (in terms of effort) from the physician. This increases 
the effort level supplied to private practice, at a smaller trade-off of a drop in public-prac-
tice effort level, therefore a net expansion in total physician effort. The average health sta-
tus therefore increases. In relative terms, the relative public-private effort ratio declines. 
The effective reduction in private health care cost also translates to higher consumption 
and savings, the latter results in an increase in the rate of physical capital investment and 
consequently, final output growth. Overall in the long run, average health status in the 
steady state increases by 1.3%, final output growth by 1.0%, and social welfare by 1.3%. 
Intuitively, given that the model specification is such that private effort is market demand-
driven, a policy that reduces effective out-of-pocket expenditure on health is necessarily 
growth- and welfare-enhancing. Analytically, it is more interesting to also examine the 
sensitivity analysis scenarios. In all the non- scenarios, the results are largely consist-
ent with the benchmark results, though the welfare decreases in the case when there is a 
larger (lower) relative contribution of goods consumption (health status) to the utility of 
households. The parameter  , which measures the (inverse) congestion factor of the public 
health service, seems to be critical in determining the structural behaviors of the model. 
While it is intuitive that a greater spending on private health care in a national health sys-
tem with plenty of slack in its public-sector health care (  = 5.0 ) is growth- and welfare-
deteriorating,12 which is along the line of arguments made in studies such as Berman and 
Cuizon (2004), the steady-state growth and welfare effects can be slightly negative when 
public-sector health service congestion is set to a very high level (  = 0.1 ). Although the 
Table 4  An increase in 
government physicians’ wage, 
for different value of  and ∗
H
 
(Percentage deviation from initial 
baseline level of social welfare)
*This involves an increase in 
G
 from 0.004 to 0.014
**Model is not solvable between the range of  = 2.012–3.412
 
H
0.1 − 0.0012 0.10 − 0.0012
0.5 − 0.0010 0.20 − 0.0024
1.0 − 0.0009 0.30 − 0.0040
1.5 − 0.0019 0.40 − 0.0060
2.0 − 0.0173 0.50 − 0.0085
2.012 − 0.0242 0.60 − 0.0114
Structural break
∗∗ 0.70 − 0.0147
0.80 − 0.0185
0.90 − 0.0229
3.412 0.0422 1.10 − 0.0334
3.5 0.0149 1.20 − 0.0397
4.0 0.0059 1.30 − 0.0469
4.5 0.0029 1.40 − 0.0550
5.0 0.0006 1.50 − 0.0643
12 Given that an extremely large magnitude of  = 5.0 is set for this specific sensitivity scenario, the large 
negative absolute deviations observed for growth and social welfare should therefore be interpreted with 
caution. Indeed, the same disclaimer should be made for other results generated, in that the absolute magni-
tude observed is purely in an experimental context.
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effects of this ‘two-regime’ characteristic is not as obvious as in the previous experiment, 
this seems to suggest a non-monotonic model response with regards to the parameter  . 
Further examinations are therefore implemented later using sensitivity analysis.
Further analysis: financing of a mixed health system
Having examined the benchmark experiments, we investigate the model further by analyz-
ing the two measures for different values of  and H . The critical role of the former is sug-
gested in the benchmark experiments, while the latter directly influences the optimal mark-
up of private practice, as seen in (10). Specifically, by focusing on the welfare effects, we 
repeated the two experiments across the continuous range of values for the two parameters, 
with results at selected intervals presented in Tables 4 and 5. From the two tables, our con-
sideration in “An increase in government physician wage rate” section is confirmed numer-
ically, that the solution system would experience a structural break in a certain range of  , 
hence creating a two-regime solution. On one hand, in the low public-sector congestion, 
high  regime, the welfare effect of an increase in government physicians’ wage is actually 
positive, though the more slack the public health care system has (larger  ), the lower the 
welfare gains. On the other hand, in the “normal” regime (where the benchmark case is in), 
the welfare effect is negative, as discussed in “An increase in government physician wage 
rate” section. However, the more congested the public health care system is (such as longer 
waiting lines, poor emergency response rates), the lower the welfare loss is associated with 
a pay rise for government physicians.
Similar two-regime solution is observed when the policy of an increase in private health 
subsidy is examined across the range of  . In the low public-sector congestion, high  regime, 
the welfare effect of greater private health financing by the government is negative, though the 
negativity is smaller the more slack the public health care system has. In the normal regime, 
an increase in private health subsidy is mostly welfare-enhancing, though at extreme cases 
Table 5  An increase in private 
health subsidy, for different value 
of  and ∗
H
 (Percentage deviation 
from initial baseline level of 
social welfare)
*This involves an increase in 
S
 from 0.022 to 0.032
**Model system not solvable between the range of  = 2.012–3.412
 
H
0.1 0.0197 0.10 0.0133
0.5 0.0133 0.20 0.0052
1.0 0.0098 0.30 0.0045
1.5 0.0055 0.40 0.0043
2.0 0.0064 0.50 0.0044
2.012 0.0103 0.60 0.0045
Structural break
∗∗ 0.70 0.0047
0.80 0.0049
0.90 0.0052
3.412 − 0.0212 1.10 0.0060
3.5 − 0.0085 1.20 0.0064
4.0 − 0.0032 1.30 0.0069
4.5 − 0.0010 1.40 0.0074
5.0 − 0.0001 1.50 0.0080
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where the public sector is experiencing significant capacity issue, further support provided to 
private health service can be welfare-deteriorating to the overall economy.
In contrast to  , the solution system appears to behave largely monotonic across differ-
ent private-practice wage mark-ups, 1∕H . For a “rewarding” scheme that raises govern-
ment physicians’ wage, with the benchmark value of  = 0.5 , the negative welfare effect 
is smaller the higher the degree of mark-up charged by the physician in private practice. In 
contrast, for the experiment of an increase in private health subsidy, positive welfare effects 
are consistently observed across all domains considered for the parameter, H.
Next, Table 6 presents the results associated with an examination of a direct trade-off 
in health financing. Specifically, by assuming that the government faces a limitation in its 
ability to reallocate funds away from non-productive expenditure, it must choose between 
public or private health financing where an increase in one category must be financed by 
the other. Starting from the benchmark combination of G = 0.004 and S = 0.022 , we 
examine this trade-off under the two different regimes of  = 0.5 and  = 5.0 . In a nor-
mal regime (represented by the benchmark case,  = 0.5 ), welfare-optimal health financ-
ing strategy appears to be promoting private health service, even if it is at the expense 
of public-sector physician wages. In contrast, in a low-congestion, high capacity regime 
(  = 5.0 ), a welfare-optimal strategy is to do the opposite of increasing government physi-
cian wage at the expense of private health subsidy.
The various examinations suggest that the question of an optimal financing of a mixed 
health system in developing countries does not have a straightforward answer. The different 
capacity or congestion issue faced by public-sector health care can result in two different 
regimes. Further, due to the presence of a dynamic trade-off observed in “An increase in 
government physician wage rate” section, the policy window would matter too. Perhaps, 
these would partly explain the current underperformance of Indonesia’s BPJS Kesehatan 
system. Theoretically, while these findings are relatively new in the macroeconomics of 
health literature, similar two-regime results have been documented in microeconomic mod-
els such as McPake et al. (2007), which examined the flow of cross-subsidy between supe-
rior and basic service in a two-tier charging system, despite a completely different theoreti-
cal approach.
Extension and robustness
To further evaluate the robustness of the results, notably the dual-regime characteristics 
identified, we modify the model by relaxing two assumptions: (i) survival probability is 
common to all individuals; and (ii) (anti-)congestion parameter is constant. Specifically, on 
the former, the survival probability that appears in (3), (5) is endogenized to be a function 
of health status, hence depending on the health service chosen in the previous period, as in:
where PH
0
,GH
0
≥ 0 are initial time-invariant probability values, h0 constant initial health 
[as in (4)], PH ,GH ≥ 0 are the elasticity parameters of survival probability with respect 
to the heath status post-treatment by private and public health care respectively. Given 
this, saving rate is different between the two groups, and the aggregate health status in the 
(23)jt =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
PH
0
(
hPH
t
h0
)PH ,
GH
0
(
hGH
t
h0
)GH ,
if j = PH
if j = GH
,
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economy is then just a weighted average of the health status of public health care users and 
private health care users:
We solve this modified version of the model, and then simulate the two policy experiments 
of a one percentage-point permanent increase in government allocation to public physi-
cians’ wage ( G ) and a one percentage-point permanent increase in government allocation 
to private health subsidy ( S ) again. The results are compared to those from benchmark 
analysis in Table 7. As seen for most variables, even though the probability is endogenized 
and therefore different between the two groups, the difference in policy effects are minimal 
(up to 5 decimal places). Qualitatively, the general equilibrium effects on economic growth 
and social welfare are similar.
In addition to  = 0.5 (same value as benchmark model, hence same regime of “ high” 
public-sector congestion), we also examine the two policies for when  = 5.0 , which belongs 
to the “ low” public-sector congestion, high capacity regime. The novel finding of a dual 
regime from Tables 4, 5, 6 remains robust. As such, even when survival probability is different 
between individuals seeking public and private health care, we find that a government subsidy 
to private health care is preferable in the “ high” public-sector congestion regime; in the low-
congestion, high capacity regime, a welfare-optimal strategy is instead to do the opposite of 
increasing government physician wage.
For the second extension, we endogenize the (anti-)congestion parameter,  , to be a func-
tion of the share of population using public health care. Specifically, we use a simple function 
of:
where 𝜘0 ≥ 0 , 𝜙 > 0 is the elasticity of the (anti-)congestion parameter with respect to 
the size of public patients. Mathematically, this means the larger the share of population 
using public service, the smaller t become, which then resulting in the effective conges-
tion brought about by a given public patient size [denominator for j = GH in (4)] will be 
larger. This then translates a lower post-treatment health status for the public health care 
users. In other words, an additional ‘aggravation’ effect associated with public health care 
is introduced.
Table 8 presents the results for the two policy experiments considered: one set for the case 
when the initial value of t is set to 0.5, whereas in another the initial value of t is set to 5.0. 
Overall, we have results that are consistent with the dual-regime finding when the policy of 
an increase in government physician wage rate is considered. However, for the policy of an 
increase in private health subsidy, the low public-sector congestion regime (  = 5.0 ) would 
now produce positive welfare effects too. This appears to suggest that, a government subsidy 
to private health care is likely to be more welfare-enhancing in Indonesia, whereas for the pol-
icy of increasing public sector wage rate, it is only welfare-enhancing in the low-congestion, 
high capacity regime.
(24)hAt = 𝜉
C
t
hGH
t
+ (1 − 𝜉C
t
)hPH
t
.
(25)t = 0(𝜉Ct )
−𝜙 ,
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Concluding remarks
We develop an endogenous growth model with a mixed health care system and physician 
dual-practice, to analyze the growth and welfare effects associated with different financing 
choice made by the government of a developing country. The model is calibrated illustra-
tively for Indonesia, which has a well-documented hybrid BPJS Kesehatan health system. 
The main implications of this study were summarized in the introduction and need not be 
repeated here. We therefore conclude by pointing out that the model could be extended 
with more elaborative micro-structures, such as features that allows for the examination 
Table 8  Policy experiment results: endogenizing the (anti-)congestion parameters; Comparing between the 
2 Regimes with different initial congestion (Percentage deviations for health status and social welfare; abso-
lute deviations from baseline for all others)
Both health status and social welfare are in index, and therefore is calculated as percentage deviation from 
initial baseline value
Both experiments involve the government making an additional 0.01 share of its expenditure to the specific 
category, by reducing non-productive expenditure
Source: Authors’ calculations
Low  regime High  regime
Initial values Deviation Initial values Deviation
An increase in government spending on public physicians’ wage ( 
G
)
Share of public patients 0.828 0.0003 0.828 0.0000
Relative effort ratio (public/private) 0.868 0.0065 0.868 − 0.0040
   Physician’s effort level in public practice 0.299 0.0003 0.299 − 0.0019
   Physician’s effort level in private practice 0.344 − 0.0022 0.344 − 0.0006
Ratio of public-practice wage rate to private-practice 
wage rate
0.068 0.1684 0.068 0.1700
   Public-practice wage rate 0.938 2.3412 0.938 2.3644
   Private-practice wage rate 13.889 0.0111 13.889 0.0156
Health status* 100.0 − 0.0024 100.0 0.0034
Growth rate 0.053 − 0.0016 0.053 0.0024
Social welfare* 29.6 − 0.0019 29.6 0.0021
(Anti-)congestion parameter 0.500 − 0.0019 5.000 0.0135
An increase in government spending on private health subsidy ( 
S
)
Share of public patients 0.828 − 0.0123 0.828 − 0.0028
Relative effort ratio (public/private) 0.868 − 0.1339 0.868 0.3030
   Physician’s effort level in public practice 0.299 − 0.0297 0.299 0.0601
   Physician’s effort level in private practice 0.344 0.0225 0.344 − 0.0378
Ratio of public-practice wage rate to private-practice 
wage rate
0.068 0.0124 0.068 − 0.0058
   Public-practice wage rate 0.938 0.1494 0.938 − 0.1095
   Private-practice wage rate 13.889 − 0.2933 13.889 − 0.4580
Health status* 100.0 0.0668 100.0 0.1070
Growth rate 0.053 0.0472 0.053 0.0076
Social welfare* 29.6 0.0493 29.6 0.0059
(Anti-)congestion parameter 0.500 0.0809 5.000 0.0175
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of two-tier pricing strategy (McPake et  al. 2007), and other health policies and regula-
tion issues evaluated in García-Prado and González (2007). Similarly, the modeling of the 
preference of physician has also been vastly simplified as a self-contained measure. For 
future extension, the supply of health workers in the economy can be fully endogenized 
to be modeled as driven by skills acquisition decision in the economy. On the empirical 
front, given the lack of country-level time series data on physician practice, pay rates, 
and patients’ choice of health services beyond those of IFLS 1–5 means a comprehensive 
empirical modeling of the theoretical framework developed in this article cannot be exam-
ined. This presents an obvious future research avenue that is worth exploring.
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